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As Democrats took over the United States Congress in January 
2007, many trade advocates trembled. Over the past decade, votes 
on  trade  liberalization  had  broken  increasingly  along  partisan 
lines.  Trade  promotion  authority  (TPA)—indispensable  for 
negotiating  new  trade  agreements—passed  by  just  one  House 
vote in December 2001, with just 21 out of 210 Democrats in 
favor. In July 2006 the Central American Free Trade Agreement–
Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) won by just two votes, with a 
minuscule 15 of 202 Democrats voting “aye.” By one accounting, 
voters in November 2006 had replaced 16 trade-friendly House 
Republicans  (and  five  similar  Senate  Republicans)  with  trade-
skeptical Democrats. No seats in either house moved in the free 
trade direction (Evenett and Meier 2006). 
In the weeks that followed, there were other warning signals. 
Addressing an audience of “approximately 100” new and old House 
Democrats in early December 2006, former Treasury Secretary 
Robert Rubin met “widespread rejection” to his plea for moderation 
on trade policy.1 And just after the new Congress convened, 39 of 
the 42 new House Democrats led by Representative Betty Sutton 
(D-OH) wrote to Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-NY), the 
newly elevated chairman of the House Committee on Ways and 
Means, calling for a fresh new trade policy approach. 
Vital to our electoral successes was our ability to take a vocal 
stand  against  the  Administration’s  misguided  trade  agenda, 
and offer our voters real, meaningful alternatives to the job-
killing agreements, such as CAFTA, that the majority of our 
opponents supported.2
From  the  George  W.  Bush  administration  vantage  point, 
such challenges came at a particularly inopportune time: US Trade 
Representative (USTR) Susan C. Schwab was struggling to revive 
the multilateral Doha Round of international trade negotiations, 
which  had  broken  up  in  disagreement  the  previous  summer. 
And  the  administration’s TPA—the  round’s  domestic  political 
underpinning—was  scheduled  to  expire  in  mid-2007  unless 
renewed by Congress. No wonder voices in the trade community 
warned of a new “protectionist” threat.3
In fact, the situation was both worse and better than these 
developments suggested. It was worse because the political base 
for Bush administration trade policy had in fact crumbled well 
before  the  2006  elections.  It  was  better  because  key  House 
Democrats, with Rangel in the lead, began 2007 by assiduously 
pursuing  a  new  bipartisan  compromise.  After  four  months  of 
good faith (though oft difficult) negotiations with USTR Schwab 
and ranking Ways and Means Republican Jim McCrery (R-LA), 
a congressional–executive branch accord was reached on May 10, 
2007, on new language for pending free trade agreements (FTAs). 
This agreement enhances the prospects for bipartisan cooperation 
across a broader range of trade policy issues.*
The  central  issue  remains TPA,  commonly  known  as  fast 
track: Will a majority of the new Congress agree to legislation that 
1. “Rubin Advice Rejected by Democrats, Citing China, Manufacturing Prob-
lems,” Inside U.S.-China Trade, December 13, 2006.
2. Letter of January 17, 2007, to Charles Rangel, quoted in Inside U.S. Trade, 
January 19, 2007, 13.
3. See, for example, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “America’s Bipartisan Battle Against 
Free Trade,” Financial Times, April 8, 2007.
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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
* In appendix A to this policy brief, Kimberly Ann Elliott analyzes in detail the past 
and proposed treatment of labor standards in FTAs.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 5    mA Y   2 0 0 7
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extends it? It is hard to see how Doha can be completed without 
such extension, for US trading partners will quite reasonably 
wonder whether Congress will approve what the administration 
negotiates. But issues both broader and narrower are shaping 
TPA’s prospects.
On the broader side, Democrats point to growing income 
inequality in the United States, accompanied by the loss of 
manufacturing jobs and stagnation in real median household 
incomes. Some link this inequality to globalization. Many find 
resonance in the arguments of Representative Barney Frank (D-
MA), now chair of the House Banking Committee on Financial 
Services,  that  it  is  wrong  to  pursue  further  steps  toward 
globalization without simultaneously acting to reduce inequality 
within the United States.4 There is also major concern about 
the record $765 billion trade deficit posted for 2007 and the 
undervalued Chinese currency, which contributed to this deficit 
and the $233 billion bilateral trade imbalance with China.5
But the immediate challenge, as the Democrat-controlled 
110th Congress assumed office in January, was the issue that had 
proved most divisive in the decade preceding: the labor rights 
provisions of FTAs. This policy brief sets forth the political and 
substantive parameters that have shaped the critical domestic 
deliberations centering on this and related issues. It concludes 
with  a  brief  analysis  of  the  May  10,  2007,  agreement  and 
suggestions for building on this success.
2006: The Collapse of The parTisan Base
The Bush administration entered office in 2001 with US trade 
policy pretty much dead in the water. Internationally, attempts 
to launch a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade round had 
foundered at Seattle. Domestically, President Bill Clinton had 
twice failed to win congressional enactment of trade negotiating 
authority (then known as fast track authority). To its credit, the 
new administration achieved renewal on both of these fronts. 
But the means it employed to win at home achieved short-term 
success but at a substantial long-term political price.
On  the  global  stage,  USTR  Robert  Zoellick  played  a 
key  role  in  negotiating  the  Doha  declaration  of  November 
2001,  succeeding  where  his  Clinton  predecessor  had  failed. 
Domestically, Republican House members took the initiative 
4.  See, for example, his National Press Club speech of January 3, 2007.
5.  On the day the 2006 deficit was announced, Democratic leaders wrote 
President Bush calling for “a new direction in U.S. trade policy” addressing 
the “unsustainable U.S. trade deficit” and promoting “broad-based, equitable 
growth for all Americans.” See letter to President Bush from Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi, Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, Ways and Means Chairman Charles 
Rangel, Trade Subcommittee Chairman Sander Levin, and eleven other Ways 
and Means Committee Democrats, February 13, 2007.
in  crafting  the  negotiating  authority  that  Zoellick  required. 
Leading the way substantively was Bill Thomas (R-CA), the 
brilliant, purposive, partisan, personally difficult chairman of 
Ways and Means.6 Leading the way politically was the House 
majority whip (later elevated to majority leader), Tom “The 
Hammer” DeLay (R-TX).
In drafting the legislation, Thomas eschewed the normal 
committee mark-up process, marginalizing senior committee 
Democrat Rangel and Sander Levin (D-MI), the ranking member 
of the trade subcommittee. Instead he reached agreement on 
what he labeled “bipartisan” legislation with a handful of junior 
Democrats  led  by  Cal  Dooley  (D-CA)  and  then  pushed  it 
through the committee on a largely party-line vote. With most 
Democrats moving into opposition, DeLay built a razor-thin 
majority by pressuring and cajoling Republicans, securing—in 
the end—the votes of all but 23.7 
The  Senate  process  was  necessarily  bipartisan,8  with  an 
expansion of the trade adjustment assistance program helping 
win substantial Democratic support in that chamber. But the 
bitter  House  legacy  endured.  It  festered  below  the  surface 
through 2004, as the Doha talks moved slowly, and FTAs with 
relatively  advanced  nations  won  relatively  broad  consensus 
support.9 But it resurfaced with a vengeance when CAFTA-
DR was brought up for a vote in July 2005. It energized the 
concerns of Democratic members and constituencies over deals 
with countries with poor perceived labor and environmental 
records, and once again senior Ways and Means Democrats 
saw their concerns unaddressed. Polarization on the final vote 
replicated 2001, only more so. With Democratic “ayes” down to 
15, Republican leaders had to mobilize even more of their own
flock. The final vote was just 217-215, even though there were 
6.  A July 27, 2003, the Washington Post feature would label Thomas as “smart 
as a whip, and almost as subtle.”
7.  In the previous seven years, every major House trade-liberalizing vote had 
found at least 50 Republicans in opposition, including the Uruguay Round in 
1994 (56) and permanent normal trade relations with China in 2000 (57). For 
details on 2001, see the appendix in Destler (2005).
8.  Democrats controlled the Senate from June 2001 through 2002.  More-
over, unless the majority party has at least 60 votes, a unified minority party 
can employ unlimited debate to prevent a bill from being brought to a vote.
9. House Democratic “ayes” on these agreements ranged from 75 for Chile 
and Singapore to 120 (a 60 percent majority) for Morocco. 
Democrats point to growing income 
inequality in the United States, 
accompanied by the loss of manufacturing 
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nine more House Republicans than there had been in 2001.10
And this was the last such victory. No one recognized this 
more than Zoellick’s successor, USTR Rob Portman, a senior 
Republican member of the Ways and Means Committee prior 
to this appointment. Confirmed after the CAFTA battle lines 
had been set, he privately characterized that process as a “train 
wreck not of my making” and moved to repair fences with senior 
Ways and Means Democrats. His successor, Susan Schwab, also 
recognized the need to move to a more bipartisan base.11
This  need  was  underscored  as  the  Republican  House 
leadership  came  apart,  with  DeLay  forced  to  resign  under 
fire,  and  Majority  Whip  Roy  Blunt  (R-MO),  the  number 
three leader who had played a central role in managing the 
CAFTA vote, losing his early 2006 bid to replace the Texan 
as majority leader. Meanwhile, President Bush’s poll numbers 
were  plummeting,  and  the  approaching  mid-term  elections 
made Republicans wary of unpopular votes taken on his behalf. 
So the basic trade-political situation in 2006 was a stalemate. 
Republicans recognized they could not themselves pass the FTA 
with Peru signed in December 2005, and Democrats found 
its labor and other provisions insufficient. So it lay dormant. 
Meanwhile, the Doha negotiations broke up in Geneva at the 
end of July 2006. 
Change in The house—and aT Ways 
and Means
November 2006 brought the resounding Democratic victory 
that the polls had predicted for most of the year. At the last 
recorded vote of the 109th Congress in December 2006 there 
were 230 Republicans and 202 Democrats. The first vote of the 
110th Congress in January 2007 was essentially a mirror image: 
233 Democrats and 202 Republicans. Democrats also gained 
six Senate seats, winning a razor-thin majority in that chamber.
Even greater was the turnaround at the Committee on 
Ways and Means, the House panel with primary jurisdiction 
over trade, where the party in power is traditionally granted 
a  greater-than-proportionate  majority  in  a  closely  divided 
House. The committee saw a shift from 23 Republicans and 16 
Democrats to 24 Democrats and 17 Republicans. This shift was 
over two-and-a-half times as great as for the chamber as a whole.12 
10. The vote on TPA in December 2001 was 215-214. Subsequently, there 
was a 216-215 procedural vote in June 2002 and a 215-212 vote on the 
conference report in July.
11. Portman’s tenure as USTR was cut short when he was elevated in April 
2006 to the position of director of the president’s Office of Management and 
Budget.
12. As measured above, Democrats’ share of the total House membership rose 
from 46.8 to 53.6 percent. Their share of Ways and Means seats went up from 
41 to 58.6 percent.
Because eight of the old Republican members left the House 
(five lost reelection, two lost bids for state governorships, and 
Chairman Thomas retired), no existing members were squeezed 
out. In fact, two new Republican faces joined the committee. 
On the side of the new majority, however, there were nine new 
members, even though only one Ways and Means Democrat 
departed (Ben Cardin [D-MD] was elected to the Senate).
Through President Bush’s first six years, Republican Ways 
and Means members had voted solidly in support of his trade 
agenda. But only two Democrats had similar records—John 
Tanner of Tennessee and William Jefferson of Louisiana—and 
the latter was removed from the committee in 2006 in the wake 
of strong allegations of corruption. So the change at Ways and 
Means seemed to bode ill for further trade expansion. But a 
closer look suggests a more nuanced situation. Most holdover 
committee Democrats had voted “aye” for some of the Bush 
FTAs. And the new members had, on average, records that were 
more, not less, trade-friendly than their senior counterparts.
Table 1 provides the details. It charts the votes of all current 
Ways and Means Democrats on 15 trade measures, from the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 to 
the catch-all trade preference legislation of December 2006. 
These measures include two votes on fast track authority, plus 
permanent normal trade relations for China in 2000 and Vietnam 
in 2006, seven FTAs, the Uruguay Round in 1994, and whether 
the United States should withdraw from the WTO in 2005. It 
then gives each member a rough numerical score of zero (least 
supportive of trade expansion) to 10 (most supportive). Also 
rated on the same scale are the two top Democratic chamber 
leaders: House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (CA) and Majority Leader 
Steny  Hoyer  (MD).  Democrats  who  voted  protrade  on  all 
measures except those that divided on a mainly partisan basis 
were given a score of 8.13 In assigning these scores, the author 
gave relatively greater weight to recent votes.14
The results are interesting. For holdover Democrats, the 
average score is 5.7. Only three (Tanner, Xavier Becerra [CA], 
and Mike Thompson [CA]) have scores of 8 or higher, and leaders 
Rangel (6) and Levin (7) rank roughly in the middle. Chamber 
leaders  are  slightly  higher:  Pelosi  (7)  and  Hoyer  (8).  Most 
interesting is the fact that seven of the nine new members score 
8, and their overall average is 7 notwithstanding the inclusion 
of Bill Pascrell (NJ), the only Ways and Means Democrat to 
score a perfect zero. Overall, Ways and Means Democrats are 
13. Four votes fall into this category: fast track authority in 1998 (brought 
up by Speaker Newt Gingrich over Clinton administration objections), TPA 
in 2001, CAFTA in 2005, and Oman in 2006. On all of these, Democrats 
held that their social concerns (especially labor rights) were not adequately 
addressed.
14. Hence, Chairman Rangel was given a “6” even though he voted against 
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significantly  more  trade-friendly  than  their  counterparts  in  the 
Democratic caucus. This is reflected in the fact that of the 15 
House votes included in this tally, only 4 (Bahrain, Morocco, 
Australia, and the Uruguay Round) found a majority of House 
Democrats voting in favor.
Two  important  conclusions  emerge:  First,  there  is  no 
overall protrade consensus available among House Democrats. 
Hence,  they  lack  the  option—available  to  Thomas  and  the 
Republicans—of  legislating  a  trade  expansion  policy  based  on 
partisan majorities. The second conclusion, however, is that if 
US trade policy can be redirected enough to satisfy the social 
concerns of those generally inclined to be positive—those with 
ratings here in the 6 to 8 range—they might be able to join with 
Republicans to form a new, bipartisan political base. Judging 
by their records, the new Democratic members of Ways and 
Means were likely to prove responsive to such an effort. It is 
unlikely that Pelosi and Rangel were unaware of this when the 
new members were selected, though other factors were clearly 
at play as well.
rangel The Consensus-seeker, 
The “un-ThoMas”
Charles B. Rangel entered the House in 1971, having defeated 
the legendary and controversial Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., in 
the Democratic primary. His upper Manhattan district includes 
Harlem and Columbia University. His voting record classifies 
him as a man of the left.15 Yet in style he is very much the 
conciliator. 
On trade, Rangel played a major role in the enactment of 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 
and also backed trade preferences for Caribbean and Andean 
nations. But generally, Thomas’s partisan, noncooperative style 
forced the New Yorker to the sidelines. Rangel looked forward 
to 2007, when Thomas’s term as chair would expire, well before 
it became clear that Democrats would win back the House. He 
made it clear that he had a very different model of how a Ways 
and Means chairman should behave. (He had also been heard to 
observe that a Democrat in this position would likely have more 
influence if he served under a Republican president.)
Once it appeared likely that the Democrats would win, 
he began talking publicly about the politics of the huge public 
issues within Ways and Means’ jurisdiction. Taxes and Social 
Security were of central importance; so was health care. But 
on these issues, partisan lines were very sharply drawn, and he 
saw little chance of accomplishing things under a Republican 
administration. Trade, however, might be different, he suggested. 
15. For example, the National Journal gave his voting record of 2006 an overall 
liberal rating of 92.7, the 19th highest in the House. “Special Report: 2006 
Vote Ratings,” nationaljournal.com, March 3, 2007.
He had tried back in 2001 to negotiate a compromise on TPA, 
only to be rebuffed (see appendix in Destler 2005). But with 
Thomas gone and the House with a Democratic majority, there 
would be a new game. And Rangel would be at its center. A 
reporter from the conservative Weekly Standard was not alone in 
concluding that his elevation might not be bad news for trade 
policy.16 
Rangel began his new role auspiciously. At the opening 
session of the new Congress, he declared a “historic opportunity 
to  move  beyond  partisan  gridlock.  .  .and  rebuild  the  trust 
between the parties,” at both the chamber and committee levels. 
He declared himself “excited to work with Ranking Member 
Jim McCrery and Republicans on the Ways and Means 
Committee  to  identify  areas  where  we  agree  and  can  make 
immediate  progress.”17  He  did  not  know  McCrery  well,  he 
noted later—Republicans and Democrats hadn’t been talking to 
one another very much in recent years—but he went out of his 
way to build ties with the Louisiana Republican. He asked his 
counterpart to join him for his first meeting with USTR Schwab 
after assuming the chairmanship. And in the weeks ahead, he 
maintained communication with McCrery even as he pursued 
negotiations with Democrats on the committee and in the full 
chamber and with Schwab and the Bush administration. When 
those negotiations did not bear fruit as rapidly as hoped, he 
joined McCrery in two “joint statements,” underscoring their 
determination to persevere.18
Like his Senate counterpart Max Baucus (D-MT), chair of 
the Senate Finance Committee, Rangel declared himself in favor 
of TPA renewal—in principle.19 The question was the specific 
terms. Meeting with committee Democrats in early February, 
he  conducted  an  informal  vote.  How  many  would  support 
16. Duncan Currie, “Learning to Love Charlie Rangel,” America.com, Novem-
ber 17, 2006.
17. Statement of January 4, 2007, reprinted on House Ways and Means Com-
mittee Web site, http://waysandmeans.house.gov.
18.  Joint Rangel-McCrery statements of March 29 and May 4, 2007, released 
by the two members.
19. Baucus endorsed TPA renewal (with “better trade enforcement capability 
and better environmental and labor provisions”) in “A Democratic Trade 
Agenda,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. He also called for reforming 
trade adjustment assistance to make it “more reflective of today’s innovative 
economy.”  Later, however, he indicated he saw no immediate need to act on 
TPA, since no new trade agreements were imminent. Inside U.S. Trade Web 
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extending the current TPA legislation? Just one raised his hand. 
How many would oppose it whatever changes were made? Again, 
just one hand. The rest would be supportive if their substantive 
concerns were addressed.20 Thus, the chairman confirmed what 
the members’ voting records indicated: They were available to 
support trade compromise. Assuming Republicans stayed on 
board, and the acquiescence, at least, of the Democratic caucus, 
such  a  compromise  would  win  an  overwhelming Ways  and 
Means majority and a comfortable margin on the floor.
If  procedures  or  intentions  were  everything,  the  story 
could stop here. Unfortunately, negotiations involve real issues. 
And the calendar and the actions it forces often determine the 
agenda. For trade policy, the overwhelming action-forcing event 
was the expiration of TPA on July 1, 2007. 
The Tpa TiMeTaBle: proCess shaping 
suBsTanCe
First  and  most  important,  its  imminent  expiration  makes 
renewal of TPA the central trade-legislative goal for the Bush 
administration in 2007. USTR Schwab is actively engaged in 
efforts to revive the Doha Round and bring it to a successful 
conclusion. To maintain US credibility in the negotiations, she 
needs to assure a fractious set of trading partners—the European 
Union, Brazil, India, among others—that Congress will vote up 
or down on whatever final terms the president and the USTR 
commit to. By the beginning of 2007, it had become impossible 
to complete a Doha accord under the existing TPA deadline. 
Looking forward, the multilateral round could be reaching a 
crucial stage just as the old authority is expiring. Unless other 
nations see credible congressional movement toward renewal at 
that time, the talks could grind to a halt, with the blame placed 
squarely in Washington’s corner.
But  TPA  also  defined  the  timetable  for  other  trade 
issues. To be considered under its expedited, no-amendment 
congressional  procedures,  agreements  under  negotiation  as 
2007 began needed to be completed in substance 90 days before 
the current authority expired in order to meet the statutory 
requirement that Congress and advisory committees be notified 
and given the opportunity to seek changes. Thus midnight on 
20. A more general account of this interchange appears in Inside U.S. Trade, 
February 9, 2007.
April 1 became the “witching hour.” The US-Panama FTA had 
been left incomplete, leaving labor standards language to be 
filled in after hoped-for agreement with Congress. The Peru and 
Colombia accords had been signed, but if their texts were to be 
changed (as Democrats sought), these changes would need to 
come in under the deadline as well. So would new FTAs under 
negotiation with Malaysia and (particularly important) with 
Korea, the seventh ranking US trading partner.
Finally,  Republicans  who  controlled  the  final,  “lame 
duck” session of the 109th Congress had insisted that trade 
preferences for Andean nations be extended for just six months. 
Their aim was to “rule from the grave,” by creating pressure for 
rapid congressional action on the Peru and Colombia FTAs, 
which would replace preferences for those countries. But this 
would effectively end preferences for Ecuador and Bolivia also, 
absent new legislation—hence it forced another item onto the 
crowded congressional trade agenda. In sum, the TPA-generated 
deadlines shaped a daunting set of conditions:
•  Senior trade policy players unaccustomed to negotiating 
with one another, most of them also unaccustomed to their 
new roles, and all of them unsure about how the new state 
of American trade politics would play out, would need to 
plunge immediately into consensus-seeking talks.
•  They would need to start with the matters with the nearest 
deadlines—which, for Congress and the executive, meant 
the terms of the three Latin American FTAs.
•  To reach consensus on those terms, they would need to 
find some resolution of substantive issues that had divided 
congressional  trade  policymakers  for  years—above  all, 
what commitments on labor standards would be included 
in FTAs.
•  All this required that they build trust among themselves, 
after six years of fractious dealings.
•  Whether they could succeed in this enterprise would go 
a long way toward determining whether they could reach 
agreement on the looming larger issue of TPA extension.
The Crux of The MaTTer: “Core” laBor 
sTandards
From the initial debate over NAFTA in 1991, congressional 
Democrats had been united in the view that US trade agreements 
should include enforceable commitments to uphold basic labor 
standards.  The  Clinton  administration  took  a  step  in  this 
direction by insisting that NAFTA be accompanied by a “side 
agreement,” whose primary operative provision was that the 
parties enforce their own labor laws. Subsequent FTAs included 
similar provisions in the text, and this criterion became known 
House Democrats lack the option of 
legislating a trade expansion policy 
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as the “Jordan standard” after the agreement negotiated with 
that nation in 2000 and approved in 2001. This and subsequent 
FTAs enacted under President Bush also included institutions 
for bilateral cooperation to strengthen enforcement of labor 
practices.
In principle, Democrats found this standard inadequate. 
It was tolerable in cases where partner nations had strong labor 
laws. Hence many supported the FTAs with Singapore, Chile, 
and  Australia.  In  at  least  one  case—the  FTA  with  Bahrain 
approved overwhelmingly in 2005—congressional action was 
delayed until the partner nation brought its labor laws up to 
snuff (and House Ways and Means Democrats contributed to 
this  process).  But  for  CAFTA-DR  (and  Oman),  inadequate 
labor  protection  was  the  primary  reason  for  overwhelming 
Democratic opposition.
Democrats wanted a commitment to enforce “core labor 
standards” as codified in the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work adopted by consensus in June 1998:21
•   freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining,
•    elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor,
•    effective abolition of child labor, and 
•   elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. 
In the alternative TPA legislation proposed by Democrats 
in 2001, the first principle was split into two, and so they 
became  five,  listed  (without  explicitly  naming  the  ILO)  as 
“the right of association, the right to bargain collectively, and 
prohibitions on employment discrimination, child labor, and 
slave labor.”22 In appendix A to this policy brief, Kimberly Ann 
Elliott provides a substantive analysis of this issue and the labor 
provisions in recent FTAs.
American  public  opinion  overwhelmingly  supports  this 
objective: In a June 2002 poll conducted by the Chicago Council 
on Foreign Relations, 93 percent of respondents agreed that 
countries taking part in international trade agreements should 
be  “required  to  maintain  minimum  standards  for  working 
conditions.” This finding was replicated in subsequent surveys 
by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and 
WorldPublicOpinion.Org  conducted  in  2004  and  2007, 
respectively. An April 2007 report by the Chicago Council on 
Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.Org found that this is 
21. For the full declaration, go to the ILO Web site, www.ilo.org.
22. These were to be included in bilateral agreements and the projected Free 
Trade Area of the Americas but not in the global Doha Round negotiations 
[HR 3019, 107th Congress, Section 2(c)(9)(A)].
not just an American sentiment: Support for including labor 
standards in trade agreements reaches 84 percent in China, 67 
percent in Mexico, and 56 percent in India.23
However,  while  the  United  States  endorsed  the  1998 
ILO Declaration, it has not ratified all of the underlying ILO 
conventions. Moreover, while there is little opposition in the 
United States to having partner nations upgrade their labor 
practices, there are concerns—among Republicans and in the 
business  community—over  what  some  label  a  “boomerang” 
effect: that such provisions, in the standard “reciprocal” form 
embodied in trade agreements, might come home to impact US 
labor practices. In a March 2007 op-ed, Theodore H. Moran 
and Gary Clyde Hufbauer offered a dramatic interpretation of 
the problem: 
US labor laws are either openly inconsistent with core ILO 
standards, or they could be challenged by lawyers if ILO 
standards trumped established statutes and long-standing 
interpretations.  A  trade  agreement  that  enthroned  ILO 
standards would not only alter federal labor law, it would 
also override state laws—triggering a constitutional howl 
from Sacramento to Albany. The practical effect would be 
to stop US trade negotiations. Few legislators would want 
to subordinate huge swaths of labor law to broad principles 
enunciated in trade agreements.24
Democrats  wanted  other  substantive  changes  made  to 
FTAs,  involving,  among  other  things,  the  environment  and 
making sure intellectual property rules did not block developing 
countries’ access to needed medicines. But from the start, the 
labor issues were central. If they could be resolved, other matters 
were expected to fall into place.25
The  process  began  with  Schwab  meeting  Rangel  and 
McCrery  on  January  18,  2007.  The  goal,  in  the  words  of 
Deputy USTR John Veroneau, was “to find a new template 
for these agreements.” Schwab, more cautiously, said they were 
“talking about substance,” particularly the labor provisions. But 
an important early difference surfaced about form. Levin, who 
also met with Schwab, thought it would be necessary to amend 
23. Other national majorities in favor include Israel (91 percent), Argentina 
(89 percent), Poland (88 percent), and the Philippines (55 percent).  See 
“World Public Favors Globalization and Trade but Wants to Protect Environ-
ment and Jobs,” WorldPublicOpinion.Org and Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs, April 26, 2007, at www.worldpublicopinion.org.
24. Theodore Moran and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “Why a ‘Grand Deal’ on 
Labor Could End Trade Talks,” Financial Times, March 12, 2007.
25. The fact that enforcement of core labor standards abroad would bring 
little immediate benefit to American workers caused many in the trade policy 
community to see the demands for such standards as a cover for protection-
ism. This may well have been true for some Democrats. For trade centrists like 
Rangel, however, they were essentially the opposite—a necessary condition for 
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the texts of the Peru and Colombia agreements: “I don’t see how 
there can be legally enforceable changes without renegotiation.” 
Schwab felt there was no need to reopen the texts. Both sides 
agreed that, as a first step, the majority and minority staffs of 
Ways and Means should work to develop a compromise, with 
an initial target date of February 19.26
By the middle of that month, however, it was reported that 
staff-level consultations were “stalled.” The aides involved were 
serious, sophisticated trade policy experts, deeply conversant 
with both the substance and politics of the issues. But unlike 
the Ways and Means staff aides of the 1980s or early 1990s, 
for whom working across the aisle was almost second nature, 
the current assistants had done remarkably little collaboration 
and codrafting since the bipartisan process leading to approval 
of  permanent  normal  trade  relations  with  China  in  2000. 
Recognizing  this  failure,  Rangel  asked  for  a  new  meeting 
with Schwab and McCrery. He also asked that USTR provide 
recommendations to move the process forward.27 Schwab was 
apparently reluctant to do so, perhaps fearing that premature 
surfacing of USTR’s idea of a reasonable final compromise might 
cause its premature rejection. But she reluctantly provided one 
later in the month. It finessed the “boomerang” problem by 
allowing parties to FTAs to base their labor laws either on ILO 
standards or on those reflected in US federal labor law. But this 
language  proved  unacceptable  to  Rangel  and  Levin.  Rangel 
said there was “no question” but that the new language would 
have to obligate the United States to meet international labor 
standards but dismissed the concerns over opening US trade 
laws to litigation by trading partners: “I am satisfied that by 
doing this, it would not harm us at all.”28
This was one of Rangel’s relatively few comments on the 
policy issues at stake, and he typically couched his remarks in 
a tone that suggested that agreement was within reach. The 
sharp-edged  Levin,  by  contrast,  spoke  out  regularly,  using 
words that highlighted substantive demands and suggested that 
26. Based on interviews and Inside U.S. Trade, January 19 and 26 and Febru-
ary 2, 2007.
27. Inside U.S. Trade, February 16, 2007.
28. Inside U.S. Trade, March 2 and 9, 2007.
the administration had a long way to go before it could pass 
congressional muster. He would emerge in spring 2007 as the 
more demanding of the two, pressing for further administration 
concessions at points when Rangel felt that Democrats’ essential 
goals had been satisfied.29 And it was difficult for Rangel to 
proceed without Levin, for he needed not just the support of his 
committee but that of the Democratic caucus and leadership, 
and  Levin  was  anything  but  a  substantive  outlier  on  trade 
insofar as they were concerned. 
Rangel recognized the need to protect his Democratic Party 
base and consulted carefully with the leadership. Pelosi and 
Hoyer, in turn, backed Rangel’s efforts, telling President Bush 
on March 7, 2007 (on the eve of his departure for Brazil and 
other Latin American nations) that success of the negotiations 
would allow them to move forward on the FTAs. In a talk 
later that month, Rangel said that one reason Democrats were 
insisting that changes be written into the agreements was the 
persisting “lack of trust” between them and the administration. 
He was seeking to rebuild that trust, with the implication that 
issues might be addressed more flexibly in the future.
agreeMenT deferred
But  the  April  1  deadline  was  approaching,  and  though 
agreement seemed close, it proved elusive. So after consulting 
with the leadership and the caucus (and with McCrery), Rangel 
and Levin released a short statement. “We are on the brink 
of restoring bipartisanship to American trade policy,” Rangel 
declared.  “The  policies  we’ve  outlined  should  send  a  clear 
message that this Congress wants trade, but we want trade that 
works for all Americans.” Specifically, they called on USTR to
•  require  countries  to  adopt,  maintain  and  enforce  basic 
international labor standards in their domestic laws and 
practices—not merely “enforce their own laws”;
•  promote sustainable development and combat global 
warming by requiring countries to implement and enforce 
common multilateral environmental agreements and address 
illegal logging of mahogany in Peru;
•  reestablish  a  fair  balance  between  promoting  access 
to  medicines  in  developing  countries  and  protecting 
pharmaceutical innovation;
29. “Rangel Struggles to Save Bipartisan Deal,” CongressDailyAM, May 3, 
2007; Robin Toner, “For Democrats, New Challenge in Age-Old Rift,” New 
York Times, May 8, 2007. Interestingly, though it is common in the trade 
policy community to view Levin as “protectionist” and Rangel as more posi-
tively inclined, their votes were identical on 13 of the 15 trade bills tabulated 
in table 1; on the other two, the Michigan Democrat voted “aye” with Rangel 
either negative (the Uruguay Round) or not voting (Australia FTA).
Linking labor standards to trade 
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•  promote US national security by protecting operations at 
US ports; and
•  ensure that [a] trade agreement accords “no greater rights” 
to foreign investors in the United States than to US 
investors.
A larger document developing the concepts behind the 
proposals was delivered to USTR but not made public.
Press coverage was generally positive: Steven R. Weisman 
noted  in  the  New  York  Times  that  the  proposed  “revisions
. . .won guarded praise from both organized labor and the Bush 
administration.”30 USTR Schwab responded, “This is another 
step in what has been a good-faith effort in a continuing dialogue 
by all sides.” And it seemed drafted to allow some leeway—“basic 
international labor standards” but no specific mention of the 
ILO; “require countries to adopt” them but no specific reference 
to the United States. But if the Democrats’ aim was to reach 
an accord by month’s end, they were unsuccessful. Within two 
days, Rangel and McCrery issued a joint statement under the 
large-type heading, “Trade Policy Negotiations Continue”: They 
remained “in active discussions with the Administration and 
our fellow leaders in Congress” and would “continue to pursue 
agreement. . .because re-establishing a bipartisan foundation in 
trade policy is more critical than meeting a procedural deadline.”
That  deadline,  however,  did  generate  a  flurry  of  other 
activity. On March 30, President Bush notified the speaker of 
the House and the president of the Senate of his “intention to 
enter into a free trade agreement with the Republic of Panama.” 
And after intensive eleventh-hour bargaining, Bush, who was in 
personal contact with Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, sent a 
similar letter of intention, at literally the eleventh hour on April 
1, concerning the just-completed FTA with that country. There 
was serious controversy about some of its provisions: Korea’s 
auto concessions, though substantial, did not look sufficient, 
to some important lawmakers, to break the domestic industry’s 
hammerlock on the Korean market,31 and that nation did not 
immediately end its embargo on imports of US beef, provoking 
an outraged protest from Senator Max Baucus. The latter 
issue was expected to be resolved before the signing of the
30.  Steven R. Weisman, “Break Seen in Logjam Over Trade,” New York Times, 
March 28, 2007.
31. Democratic senators and representatives, headed by Rangel and Senator 
Carl Levin (D-MI), had sent Bush a proposal to incorporate in the agreement 
some tough, quid pro quo provisions conditioning US tariff removal on 
successful opening of the Korean market, as measured by actual trade flows. 
They not only saw the agreement as failing to achieve this but also criticized 
the administration for failure to consult with them or US auto industry repre-
sentatives during the closing days of the negotiation. “Congressional Proposal 
to Open Korea’s Automotive Market,” attachment to letter to President Bush 
from Rangel, Senator Levin, and 13 other legislators, March 1, 2007.
agreement at the end of June 2007, but the clash over autos was 
likely to persist.
As Rangel and McCrery noted, however, the central talks 
with USTR had failed to reach agreement before the “procedural 
deadline.” This failure meant that changes in the text of the 
Peru and Colombia FTAs, on which Democrats were insisting, 
could not be made in time to be notified to Congress under the 
expiring TPA. For Panama and Korea, however, the deadline was 
effectively extended for at least a month. On March 30, Rangel 
and Levin released a statement that expressed appreciation over 
the Panama notification and added two pregnant paragraphs:
With the expectation that we could also receive notice on 
the U.S.–South Korea FTA this weekend, we remind the 
Administration that we are now entering the congressional 
review period. This time is specifically designated under the 
fast track law to provide Congress with an understanding of 
the agreements and resolve any outstanding concerns.
We  expect  that  any  use  of  the  congressional  period  will 
focus not only on the completion of the FTAs, but also on 
incorporating necessary changes on outstanding issues such 
as labor, environment, and intellectual property, which must 
be addressed before the bills will receive broad bipartisan 
support in Congress.32
The  talks  were  less  active  in  the  weeks  immediately 
thereafter. Asked about “those other negotiations” at an early 
April press conference announcing trade actions against China, 
USTR  Schwab  responded,  “that’s  another  topic  for  another 
press conference.” She added: “We are still in conversations with 
key players...I’m looking forward to re-engaging with Chairman 
Rangel, Chairman Baucus [and ranking Republicans] when I 
return next week” from a long-scheduled trip to India.33 Rangel, 
meanwhile, declared himself “surprised” that the administration 
seemed to have “lost all [of] its enthusiasm” for the bipartisan 
effort.34
The Democrats had achieved at least formal unity between 
committee  and  caucus  and  kept  committee  Republicans 
within  the  process.  Their  privately  presented  concept  paper 
had generated a dialogue and triggered the drafting of specific 
32.  “Rangel and Levin on Panama FTA Notification,” press release, March 
30, 2007. This emphasis on substantive flexibility during the review period 
stood in contrast with prior congressional insistence that the terms of trade 
agreements be essentially completed before notification. Legislators had 
chastised the Reagan administration for its notification of the Canada-US FTA 
in 1987 when important issues had not yet been resolved. Arguably, the situa-
tion here was different because the incomplete negotiation was with Congress, 
and the 90-day period was in fact designed to allow for changes in response 
to feedback from legislators and statutory advisory committees representing 
sectors of the US economy.
33. The Nelson Report (distributed via email), April 9, 2007.
34. Comments on April 17, 2007, quoted in Inside U.S. Trade, April 20, 2007.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 5    mA Y   2 0 0 7
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language by staffs at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. And 
specific agreement was reportedly nailed down on all issues save 
the central matter of labor standards.35 
The  stage  was  set,  therefore,  for  three  intensive,  roller-
coaster weeks in which agreement first seemed imminent, then 
came apart, and finally came together. On Monday, April 23, 
2007, Rangel declared his openness to assuring that the United 
States was “not vulnerable to attack by any foreign country” 
on its labor laws,36 and met with Schwab and McCrery. Their 
discussion centered on a formula that included mutual, binding 
labor commitments based on the ILO Fundamental Principles, 
with  enforcement  parallel  to  that  in  the  agreements’  trade 
provisions but with language shielding the United States from 
litigation based on those specific ILO conventions to which 
this nation was not a party.37 This would seem to satisfy the 
Democrats’  basic  demands,  and  the  three  reportedly  moved 
to conclude the agreement on this basis. But “by Friday the 
effort appeared to have hit a snag,” as Levin argued that it “went 
too far in attempting to assuage GOP fears.”38 Meanwhile, 70 
members of the House Democratic caucus (including a majority 
of the new members) had written Rangel urging that he “use the 
proposal” of late March “as the firm bottom line” and “not. . 
.back down” from any of its goals.39 
It was another near miss, like late March.  And on Friday, 
May  4,  Rangel  and  McCrery  issued  a  statement  strikingly 
similar to that of March 29, entitled “Trade Policy Negotiations 
Continue”: “We are still actively negotiating on trade policy 
with all parties and all levels. . .We will continue working into 
the foreseeable future to resolve any remaining differences.”40 
But this time would prove different. Rangel secured the crucial 
support  of  Speaker  Nancy  Pelosi.  The  language  on  labor 
standards was tweaked once again—with no explicit reference 
to ILO conventions, and a statement that “the obligations of 
this agreement, as they relate to the ILO, refer only to the 1998 
ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work.” With Levin now on board, Pelosi hosted a news 
conference at 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 10, 2007. Among 
those joining her were Rangel, Schwab, Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson, Senator Max Baucus, Representative McCrery, 
and Levin.
35. Apparent administration concessions on balancing “access to medicines 
in developing countries” with “protecting pharmaceutical innovation” have 
generated concerns within the intellectual property coalition, an important 
supporter of previous FTAs.
36.  Remarks at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 23, 
2007, quoted in Inside U.S. Trade, April 27, 2007.
37. CongressDailyAM, May 3, 2007.
38. CongressDailyAM, May 3, 2007.
39. Letter of April 20, 2007, quoted in Inside U.S. Trade, April 27, 2007.
40. Ways and Means Committee press release, May 4, 2007.
a neW Trade poliCy for aMeriCa 
 
“Nearly  50  years  ago,”  Pelosi  declared,  “President  John  F. 
Kennedy advanced a new trade policy that cemented Democrats 
as the party of free and fair trade. Today, we build on that 
tradition to announce a new, bipartisan breakthrough for fair 
trade where we expand opportunities for American businesses, 
workers, and farmers.” Rangel declared that “today’s agreement 
signals a new direction and renewed spirit of bipartisanship.” 
McCrery called it a “good and fair compromise.” Schwab saw “a 
historic bipartisan breakthrough.” Baucus declared that “trade in 
America is turning a corner toward more cooperation. . .where 
more Americans are involved in embracing world change.”41 
The deal was essentially what the Democrats sought, and 
it closely tracked their March policy statement. In addition to 
labor standards and a range of environmental provisions, which 
would be subject to the same dispute settlement procedures and 
remedies as the trade commitments, the understanding struck 
a new balance between intellectual property rights and trading 
partners’ health needs. It provided a “port security” exception to 
US obligations under the services chapter, added a provision that 
foreign investors would not be granted greater rights, within the 
United States, than US investors, and set forth a multifaceted, 
albeit general, “strategic worker assistance and training (SWAT) 
initiative.” The short and extended summaries of this agreement 
are reprinted in appendix B to this policy brief.
The agreement assured committee and leadership support 
for the Peru and Panama FTAs, establishing a clear path to their 
adoption. Its provisions applied also to Colombia and (except 
the  intellectual  property  rights/pharmaceutical  provisions) 
to Korea as well. But there remained serious issues involving 
both—human rights violations in the former and market access 
concerns in the latter. And while Rangel would surely bring the 
preponderant majority of Ways and Means Democrats with 
41. Congressional Quarterly transcriptions, May 10, 2007; Rangel-McCrery 
joint press release, May 10, 2007.
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him, the breadth of support among their House counterparts 
remained unclear. Pelosi had not heeded a call by a few members 
to bring the accord formally before the Democratic caucus. 
Rather, she and Rangel locked it by moving immediately from 
agreement to announcement. 
The initial interest group responses were in fact positive, 
albeit muted. The Business Roundtable, the US Chamber of 
Commerce,  and  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers 
issued statements of support (even though the agreement tilted 
against their preferred positions). Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
expressed concern about the potential weakening of intellectual 
property protection. And AFL-CIO President John Sweeney 
cautiously “commend[ed] Chairman Rangel for the substantial 
progress made in improving workers’ rights and environmental 
standards in the Peru and Panama Free Trade Agreements.”42 
The  agreement  was  labeled  “A  New  Trade  Policy  for 
America.”  For  each  of  the  primary  negotiators,  it  was  an 
enormous  personal  triumph.  Rangel  had  decided  early  that 
bipartisan accord on trade was possible and staked his reputation 
on bringing it about, working carefully with colleagues of both 
parties, persisting when hopes receded. When Levin demanded 
more, Rangel found ways to respond. It was the New Yorker’s 
persistence, and the support of his committee, that enabled Pelosi 
to step forward on an issue where her caucus remained divided. 
And his wisdom in reaching out to McCrery was vindicated as 
the ranking Republican worked assiduously and effectively to 
find compromises on the toughest issues. Majority Leader Steny 
Hoyer was helpful behind the scenes. Levin’s toughness added 
credibility to the final product. At the staff level, Rangel’s chief 
trade assistant, Timothy Reif, provided essential support and 
maintained the faith that agreement would in fact be reached.
On the Senate side, Finance Chair Max Baucus allowed 
Ways and Means to have the primary action during the process 
and  provided  a  strong  endorsement  of  the  final  product. 
Ranking member Charles Grassley (R-IA) worked to bring his 
42. He added, however, that “we will vigorously oppose the Colombia and 
Korea agreements and the renewal of Fast Track trade authority” (AFL-CIO 
statement of May 11, 2007).  
skeptical Republican flock along, meeting with them just hours 
before the deal was announced. 
The agreement was a triumph also for USTR Schwab. She 
recognized early that trade policy needed a new bipartisan base 
and that Rangel offered the only realistic hope of achieving 
it. She took a serious risk in conceding most issues early: to 
demonstrate administration seriousness and because she hoped 
to conclude the deal as early as February. When that proved 
impossible, she stayed with it, finding additional things she 
could offer to help Rangel bring the Democrats together. At 
the  same  time,  she  succeeded  in  her  determination  to  have 
Colombia covered by the agreement—though she realized that 
Bogota  would  also  need  to  address  egregious  human  rights 
issues.43 She had the essential support of President Bush. And 
Paulson’s involvement helped to head off any possible resistance 
from within the administration. Schwab would have liked, of 
course, to have had support of TPA included in the deal. But 
she recognized that was impossible at this stage—the only way 
to make it possible in the future was to resolve the labor and 
environmental issues that had hitherto proven so divisive.
 
ToWard reneWal of Tpa: soMe opTions
With the issue of FTA language now resolved, the way was clear 
for congressional consideration of broader trade issues. Schwab 
had  not  expended  all  that  time  and  energy  simply  to  win 
approval of the FTAs. Doha remained her primary business, 
and TPA would be necessary to any Doha agreement. 
Yet immediate action on TPA is unlikely. To be sure, the 
May 10, 2007, agreement has taken two essential steps in that 
direction. It establishes a bipartisan foundation of confidence 
and  trust.  And  it  provides  a  template,  specific  language  on 
labor  and  environmental  issues  for  inclusion  in  negotiating 
instructions  for  future  FTAs.  But  serious  differences  remain 
on the current FTAs with Colombia and Korea. Addressing 
these will take time and is likely to strain the new cooperative 
relationships. So members will not move immediately to the 
broader agenda.
When and if they do, any TPA extension legislation will 
have its own complications. Other trade proposals are likely to 
be bundled in: further expansion and reform of trade adjustment 
assistance, changes in laws regarding China and exchange rates, 
43.  In a letter to Schwab negotiated just before the agreement, Rangel and 
Levin declared that the terms “for Peru and Panama. . .must be incorporated 
into the Colombia FTA” but highlighted “special problems. . .including the 
systemic, persistent violence against trade unionists and other human rights 
defenders, the related problems of impunity,  and the role of the paramilitaries 
in perpetuating these crimes.” They concluded, “We are working to assess 
concrete proposals and undoubtedly will visit Colombia for first hand observa-
tions, as we explore a timely and effective solution.” 
If Congress is serious about gaining 
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among others. Expanding the range of trade matters addressed 
in  such  legislation  can  broaden  support  and  reduce  the 
political burden of passing TPA as a “stand-alone” matter. But 
working out their specifics can also add to the legislative time 
required. Ways and Means Democrats are also likely to press 
for  new  mechanisms  for  consultation  with  Congress  during 
negotiations,  new  procedures  enhancing  legislators’  leverage 
in these negotiations, and perhaps involvement of members of 
Congress in the original choice of FTA negotiating partners.44 
On the other hand, they will presumably not set labor rights 
negotiating  objectives  for  a  Doha  agreement—though  they 
will insist on applying the agreed labor et al. template to any 
future FTAs. (In their 2001 legislative proposal, Rangel and his 
colleagues accepted the exclusion of labor issues from current 
global WTO negotiations.)
What,  then,  are  the  options,  and  potential  political 
paths, for renewal of TPA in 2007? A prerequisite, of course, 
is sufficient progress toward a Doha accord to make it seem 
worthwhile for the president, members of Congress, and the 
business community to invest the energy and political resources 
that will be required to move legislation through the House and 
the Senate in an expeditious manner. If the recent revival of talks 
peters out, TPA extension will lose its primary rationale. On 
the other hand, unless there is a clear prospect of congressional 
action on TPA, US leverage at Doha will be undermined. It is 
possible, however, that the negotiations could advance enough 
to  offer  promising  opportunities  to  US  goods  and  services 
industries, with TPA required to complete the accord.45
Delineating realistic options for TPA renewal is further 
complicated by the fact that they involve three dimensions: 
when TPA is extended, for how long, and for what range of trade 
agreements. Concerning the first, we will assume that enacting 
a new law by July 1, 2007, is both unlikely and unnecessary 
but  that  a  successful  Doha  Round  will  probably  require 
congressional action by the end of the first session of the 110th 
Congress—at the very least, a bill reported out by a strong 
bipartisan Ways and Means Committee majority. Concerning 
both the second and third, there is a trade-off: The broader 
the range of possible negotiations covered, and the longer the 
44.  In their 2001 proposal, Rangel et al. proposed a structured, biennial re-
view of progress in ongoing trade negotiations, with a procedure allowing one-
third of House or Senate members to bring a resolution of disapproval to the 
floor for a vote and a requirement that a group of congressional trade advisers 
endorse, at the conclusion of negotiations, the president’s required certification 
that statutory negotiations had been met. (The AFL-CIO released, in March 
2007, a particularly stringent [and surely unworkable] proposal including 
a variant of this last procedure [“Fast Track or the Right Track,” AFL-CIO 
Executive Council Statement, March 2007, Las Vegas, Nevada].)
45.  It is also conceivable—though less likely—that other possible agree-
ments—a Free Trade Area of  the Asia Pacific or an FTA with Japan—could 
provide serious motivation for TPA extension.
time period for TPA extension, the greater the likely detail in 
negotiating objectives and the stronger the requirements for 
interbranch consultation.
Option One: Comprehensive, Multiyear Extension. Congress 
would replicate the form of 2001, enacting a comprehensive 
bill covering all WTO and FTA negotiations completed over 
a period of several years—perhaps three, with two more years 
possible unless blocked by the House or Senate. The new FTA 
template  on  labor  and  environmental  standards  would  be 
incorporated  in  the  broad  legislation.  New  mechanisms  for 
congressional engagement would need to be negotiated, and 
USTR would certainly seek to add flexibility to devices, like 
those noted above, which Democrats are likely to propose. 
The problem with this option is that it could take well over 
a year to negotiate and enact; moreover, Democrats might well 
be reluctant to grant this much, all at once. A variant of option 
one would be extension that was comprehensive in coverage 
but ended on July 1, 2009. Any further action would await the 
election and inauguration of a new president.
Option Two: TPA Extension for Doha Only. Congress could 
defer  until  2009  the  matter  of  broader TPA  extension  and 
act specifically to reinforce the Doha Round. When the fast 
track  timetable  ran  out  in  early  1993,  Congress  extended 
fast track until April 1994 but limited its applicability to the 
Uruguay  Round/GATT  talks.  This  extension  made  possible 
their successful conclusion and also provided a useful de facto 
deadline of December 15, 1993. Rangel raised the possibility 
of Doha-specific TPA on January 30, 2007, in a preliminary 
fashion,  in  a  colloquy  with  Gene  Sperling,  former  Clinton 
economic adviser, who was testifying before his committee. He 
reiterated his willingness to consider such action in a National 
Press Club speech on April 17.46 Such an authorization would 
likely be for a relatively short period—until the middle or end 
of 2008, perhaps.
This  authorization  could  be  enacted  as  stand-alone 
legislation, as in 1993. A variant here might include authorization 
to negotiate other major agreements specified in the legislation, 
such as a potential Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). 
This  alternative,  raised  by  the  administration  at  the  2006 
meeting  of  the  Asia-Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC) 
forum, might conceivably enhance US leverage in the Doha 
Round with those (such as the European Union, Brazil, and 
India) that would be excluded (Bergsten 2007). A disadvantage, 
under either of these Doha options, would be that the United 
States would be unable to respond, in the short run, to others’ 
FTA initiatives.
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Option  Three:  TPA  Extension  for  Doha  Plus  FTAs  under 
Negotiation. This option would allow conclusion of agreements 
(e.g., FTA with Malaysia) under negotiation but not concluded 
on April 1, 2007. It would plausibly have a concluding date of 
July 1, 2009. An advantage of this option, from the perspective 
of congressional Democrats, is that it would facilitate changes 
in the text of the Peru and Colombia accords—though it might 
not be necessary for consideration of such changes under TPA.47 
Option three would exclude, in practice, the launch of new 
FTA negotiations, weakening the US international hand in the 
run-up to the 2008 presidential elections. But it may in any 
case prove impractical to launch new FTA negotiations in that 
time period.
TWo final oBservaTions
The  Rangel-McCrery-Schwab  negiations  centered  on  the 
issue of labor rights. Many in the US and global trade policy 
communities  consider  this  focus  inappropriate  at  best  and 
pernicious  at  worst.  A  Washington  Post  editorial  reflected 
this  view  in  characterizing  the  administration’s  negotiation 
with  Democrats  on  labor  and  environmental  provisions  as 
“protectionist  pandering.”48  This  author  does  not  agree.  As 
argued  elsewhere,  linking  labor  standards  to  trade  agreements 
is entirely legitimate in a world where globalization is putting 
increased stress on domestic economic arrangements (Destler 2005, 
chapter 10). To say it is legitimate, of course, does not mean it 
is effective, at least in the near term. If this author could rewrite 
history he would have Democrats devoting far less energy to labor 
practices in other countries and far more to enhancing domestic 
support for Americans who are, at least temporarily, globalization’s 
losers.49 But if the current emphasis on basic labor standards ends 
up  facilitating  trade  agreements  rather  than  blocking  them,  it 
will likely have a significant impact on US welfare through trade 
expansion, a marginal positive impact on labor practices overseas, 
a minuscule impact at best on workers’ welfare within the United 
States, and no direct impact at all on US labor laws. So it is clearly 
preferable to a stalemate.
This discussion brings us to the final point: that there is a 
real problem of wage stagnation and growing income inequality 
47. The question is whether Congress could consider, under TPA procedures, 
an agreement whose text had been altered—as a result of consultations with 
Congress—from that notified to Congress under the TPA timetable. The law 
here is at best ambiguous.
48. “Trade Offensive,” Washington Post, April 12, 2007.
49. The May 10, 2007, agreement did include a sweeping commitment to a 
“strategic worker assistance and training initiative,” with its contents presum-
ably to be developed. And senior Ways and Means Democrat Jim McDermott 
(D-WA) has introduced legislation to provide wage insurance to American 
workers displaced by economic change. 
within the United States. This problem has persisted for the 
better part of 30 years, and progressives should be looking for 
comprehensive means to address it. Trade is, at most, a marginal 
contributor,  and  constraining  trade  is  unlikely  to  improve 
matters at all. It is highly appropriate for members to include, in 
trade legislation, measures to expand programs to compensate 
and re-fit Americans whose economic lives are disrupted by 
trade and broader economic change.50 But if Congress is serious 
about gaining real traction on the inequality problem, members 
need to review and refashion a broad range of legislation: on 
taxes, health care, labor rights, education, pension reform, and 
so on. Both the substance and the politics of these issues are 
daunting. But if senators and representatives are serious about 
repairing America’s frayed social compact, these are the issues 
where they should get to work.
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laws as an encouragement for trade or investment involving 
the other party.
Finally, post-Jordan FTAs limit the potential penalty for 
labor violations to imposition of a “monetary assessment,” set 
at a maximum of $15 million (regardless of the income level 
of the partner), which can be collected by suspending trade 
benefits as a last resort. Violations of most other provisions in 
these agreements, if not rectified, can lead to the suspension of 
trade benefits.
The “Jordan Standard”
The  Clinton  administration  negotiated  an  agreement  with 
Jordan that was similar to the above with a couple of important 
exceptions. First, the language calling on parties to “strive to 
ensure” that labor laws are consistent with ILO core principles 
and that those laws are not weakened for competitive reasons is 
not explicitly excluded from enforcement. Second, the dispute 
settlement  process  and  potential  sanctions  for  labor  (and 
environmental) violations are the same as for all other parts of 
the agreement.
Problems with These Standards
The “enforce your own laws” standard used in the post-Jordan 
agreements  makes  little  substantive  sense.  It  exhorts  parties 
to the agreement to ensure that their laws are consistent with 
international  standards  and  recognizes  that  weakening  or 
waiving existing laws to promote trade or attract investment 
is  inappropriate.  But  the  only  provision  that  is  enforceable 
discourages countries from failing to enforce their own laws, 
which creates perverse incentives to avoid raising standards or 
to lower them if they cannot be effectively enforced. The further 
a country’s laws are from international norms, the bigger the 
problem. 
The incentives created by the Jordan standard are not as 
perverse because the language calling on parties to “strive to 
ensure” the consistency of their laws with international standards 
is theoretically enforceable. An aggressive executive might use the 
“strive to ensure” language to successfully challenge derogations 
from labor laws for competitive reasons. But it seems far less 
likely that a party could successfully challenge a partner for not 
sufficiently striving to ensure improvements in its standards.
Finally, all the FTAs that incorporate labor standards in the 
main text (all since the North American Free Trade Agreement) 
share the weakness of using a US definition of “internationally-
recognized” labor standards. This definition predates the 1998 
ILO  Declaration  on  Fundamental  Principles  and  Rights  at 
appendix a 
TreaTMenT of laBor issues
in us BilaTeral Trade agreeMenTs
Kimberly Ann Elliott
While there are minor differences in the text of the labor chapters 
in recent agreements, the key section is identical in every free 
trade agreement (FTA) from those with Singapore and Chile to 
the ones with Peru and Colombia:
A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, 
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, 
in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement.
An article in each agreement explicitly states that this is the 
only paragraph subject to dispute settlement in these agreements. 
Moreover, the agreements emphasize that the parties
•  may adopt or modify their labor laws and
•  retain discretion in enforcement activities and the allocation 
of resources to enforcement versus other labor priorities.
 
Flexibility  to  amend  labor  laws  is  needed,  especially  in 
developing countries with overly rigid labor regulations, which 
push many workers into the informal sector, where they receive 
no protection at all. But this language also creates large loopholes 
that would make the “enforce your own laws” standards difficult 
to implement in practice.
In  addition,  each  agreement  since  the  Jordan  FTA, 
negotiated  by  the  Clinton  administration  and  submitted  to 
Congress by President George W. Bush in 2001, also includes 
nonbinding  language  in  which  the  parties  reaffirm  their 
commitment to the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 
its Follow-Up. The language is merely hortatory, however, and 
calls on parties to
•  “strive  to  ensure”  that  internationally  recognized  labor 
rights are protected by law,
•  “strive to ensure” that laws are consistent with internationally 
recognized  labor  rights  and  “strive  to  improve  those 
standards in that light,” and
•  “strive to ensure” that they do not lower or weaken labor 
Kimberly Ann Elliott is a senior fellow jointly at the Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics and the Center for Global Development. She is coauthor of 
Can Labor Standards Improve under Globalization? with Richard B. Freeman 
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Work, which enunciated a consensus definition of core labor 
standards. The ILO list includes freedom of association; the right 
of workers to bargain collectively; freedom from forced labor; 
the eventual abolition of child labor; and nondiscrimination 
in employment. The US definition, which goes back to 1984, 
excludes nondiscrimination and includes “acceptable conditions 
of work” relating to wages, hours, and occupational health and 
safety.
Labor Standards under “A New Trade Policy
for America”
The compromise reached on labor standards in the pending 
FTAs requires the parties “to adopt, maintain and enforce in 
their own laws and in practice the five basic internationally-
recognized  labor  standards,  as  stated  in  the  1998  ILO 
Declaration.”1 A summary of the agreement released by Ways 
and Means Committee Ranking Member Jim McCrery states 
that the obligations refer “only” to the ILO Declaration and 
does not explicitly mention any role for the legally binding 
conventions  that  define  the  fundamental  principles  in  the 
ILO context. Inside U.S. Trade reports that the deal does not 
address whether ILO jurisprudence could be used in a dispute 
settlement case. It is also not clear from the summary whether 
the  compromise  changes  the  traditional  US  definition  of 
internationally recognized worker rights and whether challenges 
to the “acceptable conditions of work” standard are still covered.2 
The summary of the new approach also says that parties 
to  trade  agreements  will  be  prohibited  from  lowering  labor 
standards  for  competitive  advantage  and  that  this  provision 
will be legally binding and enforceable. The new approach also 
reduces the flexibility that countries have in choosing how to 
allocate resources to enforcement and prosecution of labor law 
violations. Under the compromise, the labor (and environment) 
chapters  will  be  subject  to  the  same  dispute  settlement 
procedures—and potential penalties—as other parts of these 
trade agreements.
The new formulation removes the incentive to lower labor 
laws if countries are having trouble enforcing them. But it could 
also be used to challenge labor law reforms that are needed in 
some cases to promote employment in developing countries, 
and that possibility is troubling from a development perspective. 
It is also unclear from the available information how adequate 
enforcement effort will be measured and assessed.
Thus  far,  the  business  community  response  to  the 
announcement of a compromise has been relatively positive, 
despite the fact that it apparently does not provide an explicit 
“safe  harbor”  protecting  US  labor  laws  from  challenge.  The 
United States has ratified only 3 of the 8 core ILO conventions 
because of concerns that certain aspects of US labor law are 
not in full compliance with the terms of some of them. The 
emphasis on the obligations under the labor chapter referring 
only to the ILO Declaration is intended to provide assurance 
on this point, but it leaves unclear how those obligations would 
be interpreted in practice.
Nevertheless, a successful challenge to US laws seems highly 
unlikely. First, it should be noted that Congress has determined 
that trade agreements will not be “self-executing” in US laws, as 
are some treaties, which means that implementing legislation 
is needed to make any changes to US law required to come 
into compliance with trade agreements. In those bills, Congress 
includes a section stating that nothing in the trade agreement 
has any effect on US federal or state law, or creates a private right 
of action (to challenge US government actions under the trade 
agreement), unless specified in the implementing legislation.
This still leaves the possibility of a challenge to US laws 
under the dispute settlement provisions of trade agreements. But 
envisioning a successful challenge that would result in changes 
to US labor laws is difficult since the trading partner would 
have  to  show  that  inadequate  US  labor  laws  affect  bilateral 
trade. Assuming that hurdle can be overcome and a US labor 
law is found to be inconsistent with its obligations under a trade 
agreement, US policymakers would have the choice to comply 
by  changing  US  labor  laws—through  normal  congressional 
procedures and without a veto from the president—or paying 
compensation  or  facing  retaliation  from,  in  most  cases,  a 
much  smaller,  weaker  country.  Indeed,  most  FTA  partners 
have sought to negotiate trade agreements because they want 
to solidify relations with the United States, and it is not clear 
what incentive these governments would have to bring a labor 
complaint.
A More Radical Change in Direction
It is likely that the agreement reached for revising outstanding 
FTAs will be used as the template when Congress is ready to 
revise  and  renew  the  president’s  trade  promotion  authority. 
Nevertheless, there are still problems with the overall approach 
to labor standards in trade agreements, and policymakers may 
want to consider alternatives. The current approach incorporates 
1. The new template is to be applied in some fashion to all four pending agree-
ments, but congressional Democrats have made it clear that more is required 
to address their concerns regarding labor rights in Colombia and the auto and 
other issues in the Korea agreement. 
2.  As a complement to the new agreement on labor standards, it would be 
useful for the US Senate to ratify ILO Convention 111 on nondiscrimination, 
which has been languishing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
for several years. That would raise the US ratification record to 3 of the 8 core 
conventions. In contrast, Colombia, Panama, and Peru have ratified all eight.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 5    mA Y   2 0 0 7
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on  practices  intended  to  promote  exports  or  attract  foreign 
investment  by  illegitimate  means.  Some  are  concerned  that 
such a provision would be abused for protectionist purposes. 
But there is remarkably little evidence of protectionist abuse in 
existing trade-labor linkages, and safeguards could be designed 
to avoid it. For example, the current Article XX targets only 
those exports that are directly implicated in illegitimate labor 
practices. In addition, it would be important to allow for two 
separate levels of external review—by the ILO to determine 
whether labor violations exist in the exporting country and by a 
dispute settlement panel under the trade agreement to determine 
whether the actions of the importing party are consistent with 
the terms of the agreement.
a broad, positive obligation that requires countries to implement 
certain  labor  standards.  But  this  approach  raises  questions 
about how intrusive trade agreements should be in areas mainly 
involving domestic regulation. Moreover, this approach creates 
a number of practical problems, including how to determine 
what constitutes a “sustained or recurring course of action or 
inaction” or how much enforcement is enough.
A simpler approach could be based on Article XX(e) of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which allows countries 
to prohibit the import of products made with prison labor. US 
FTAs incorporate the Article XX exception, and the forced labor 
language could be expanded to include egregious and trade-
related violations of the other core principles. This inclusion 
would focus attention where it should be in trade agreements: 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall program 
of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views 
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